Malaysia is no stranger to the US-Australia alliance, a fixture of the post-World War II Indo-Pacific regional order. Both countries are important partners to Malaysia across a range of endeavors, such as trade and investment, defense, education, and institutional and cultural exchanges. Bilateral and multilateral relations are resilient and remain functional and productive despite occasional political spats. In recent years, however, the focus and proactive thrusts of this alliance, shaped by its perception of the evolving strategic and security realities in the Asia Pacific, have become a conundrum for Malaysian policymakers.
There is a strong correlation between how Malaysia views its place in the region and its priorities as it attempts to navigate contemporary major power rivalry, with China being an especially critical part of the equation. Consequently, Malaysia is now increasingly cautious when engaging with both the United States and Australia, especially on the public-facing side of defense and security. The following three points attempt to unpack the reasons behind this sense of unease in the Malaysian establishment.
First, in Malaysia, there is widespread concern that the US-Australia alliance has settled on approaching the rise of China not just as a competitor but as a strategic rival that must be actively contained. The Alliance’s subsequent policies, in concert with those of its partners, are deemed to accentuate, rather than mitigate, discord and uncertainty, with Southeast Asia bearing the brunt of the fallout. Even Malaysian academicians and policymakers concerned about China, especially on the South China Sea dispute, are skeptical about the efficacy of a containment approach and question if the tactic is even desirable.
Malaysian policymakers also worry that despite denials by Beijing and Washington, a binary choice will eventually be imposed on countries like Malaysia, with negative ramifications for both the country and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a keystone of its foreign policy. Current US-Australia policies are deemed to expedite this unwanted outcome. Targeted policies against China on trade and technology that could impact third countries like Malaysia, which seeks to enmesh itself with multiple mechanisms and systems. These policies, which have support from a notable portion of the US-Australian policymaking circles, have convinced some Malaysian observers that US-Australia initiatives are less inclusive than Beijing’s own.
Second, Malaysian policymakers perceive a distinct gap in how Malaysia, Australia, and the United States seek regional security. The latter two are thought to seek security from Asia. Subsequently, they are working to contain threats within the region. Whereas Malaysia, in line with the general tenor of Southeast Asian states, seeks security within its region by emphasizing cooperative mechanisms with major Asian stakeholders to minimize risks. This difference in perspective was articulated by Raja Dato’ Nushirwan Zainal Abidin, the head of Malaysia’s National Security Council, in an April 2024 Strategist article. The publication offers a rare public glimpse into the strategic thinking of someone at the highest levels of Malaysia’s security bureaucracy.
Another compounding factor is the long-standing, but not blinding, distrust within various segments of the Malaysian establishment of “Western” intentions and double standards, from both the past and present, toward Asia. Both internal and external actors have exploited this bias, damaging perceptions of the US-Australia alliance. Former Prime Minister Mahathir’s frequent and strident criticisms of US hegemony and former President Bush’s description of Australia as a “deputy sheriff” still live rent-free in the minds of many senior Malaysian policymakers.
Third, Malaysia’s reservations often contradict its aspiration for the alliance. Despite the highlighted concerns, Malaysia desires to continue its longstanding strategic relationships with Australia and the United States. This includes comprehensive defense and security partnerships, which are deeply appreciated by Malaysian stakeholders and, in some cases, crucial to the domain awareness and capacity upgrades of the defense services. Malaysia is also connected to both countries via a range of trade and ASEAN-centered multilateral mechanisms.
Diplomatic ties with Australia predate the independence of Malaya, the forerunner state to modern Malaysia, and boasts strong people-to-people and educational links. It is the second country, after China, with which Malaysia enhanced bilateral relations via a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” a deliberate decision for Malaysian policymakers. Economic ties bolstered the importance of US- Malaysia relations, as the United States is a major source of high-quality FDI. Despite the framework lacking a much-desired market-access component, Malaysia’s decision to join IPEF in 2022 was another deliberate signal that US efforts to expand its multilateral economic engagement with the region were both desired and appreciated.
While these three points are distinct in their own ways, they also overlap regarding how stakeholders in Malaysia perceive, debate, and shape policy toward the United States, Australia, and their alliance. Malaysia’s response to the AUKUS trilateral security partnership exemplifies this. Despite Australia’s high-level engagement, the initial reaction was critical of AUKUS and the destabilizing risks it allegedly might trigger. Talking points from key Malaysian leaders nearly mirrored soundbites from Beijing and reflected what this writer believes to be a willful misunderstanding of the submarine component of the trilateral alliance. Indonesia was the only other Southeast Asian country to be as outspoken, although this was mainly a Foreign Ministry position. Then minister of defense and now president- elect Prabowo was far more agnostic. Malaysia’s official position has not changed, although further subsequent engagement and a change of political leadership might have resulted in a more nuanced approach.
The issues raised above are by no means exhaustive and remain contested even within the Malaysian policy space. Attitudes toward the US-Australia Alliance, as well as the scope of engagement, diverge among various agencies and ministries with further oscillation between public and private opinions. The sense of cautiousness in how Malaysia now engages with the United States and Australia is perceived by some within the policymaking space as strategic prudence. At the same time, others believe that it limits the country’s strategic options and contributes to the perceived weakening of Malaysia’s longstanding non-alignment posture.
Given the risk-averse nature of Malaysian foreign policymaking, this perception and approach toward the US-Australia alliance will remain in place for the foreseeable future as long as Malaysia believes that all, if not most, of its interests are achievable. Any significant reassessment will be externally driven by Washington, Canberra, and perhaps Beijing.
This article was also published in East West Centre (Asia Pacific Bulletin) on 30 September 2024.
