



Report

# **COP29 masterclass**

Compiled by Kieran Li Nair and Ahmad Afandi With contributions from Eqram Mustageem

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Institute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia

# **ISIS Malaysia**

The Institute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia is the country's premier thinktank, with a mandate to advance Malaysia's strategic interests. As an autonomous research organisation, we focus on foreign policy and security; economics and trade; social policy and nation-building; technology and cyber; and climate and energy.

We actively conduct Track-Two diplomacy, promoting the exchange of views and opinions at the national and international level. We also play a role in fostering closer regional integration and international cooperation through forums, such as Asia-Pacific Roundtable, and networks like ASEAN Institutes of Strategic & International Studies network, Pacific Economic Cooperation Council and Network of East Asian Think-Tanks.

# Contributors

**Kieran Li Nair** is a senior researcher in the Climate, Environment and Energy programme. Her research interests lie in climate adaptation, diplomacy, finance and justice. She has extensive experience volunteering in numerous forms of advocacy, although her strongest passion lies with climate advocacy. She has published a paper on climate resilience in urban areas and more recently acted as a Malaysian youth representative to the 28th Conference of Parties in Dubai. Kieran currently acts as the co-focal point of the Malaysian Youth Delegation.

**Ahmad Afandi** is a fellow in the Climate, Environment and Energy programme. His primary research interests lie in climate resilience, biodiversity and environmental governance. His most recent work includes reviewing the National Policy on Climate Change 2009 for the Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and Climate Change and diving into the prospective economic instruments for climate adaptation and nature conservation. He also serves as a resource person for the CSO-SDG Alliance and the All-Party Parliamentary Group Malaysia on Sustainable Development Goals.

**Eqram Mustaqeem** is lawyer and a climate policy analyst at the Third World Network. He writes on adaptation matters from a Global South dimension at the United Nations Climate Change negotiation processes. He was a Perdana Fellow at the Prime Minister's Department for religious affairs working in the Law & Parliamentary Affairs Secretariat and a Young Southeast Asian Leadership Initiative (YSEALI) fellow for environmental affairs at the University of Montana. He is also a volunteer with Sahabat Alam Malaysia.

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- Aznie Rahim Malaysian Water Partnership
- Yin Shao Loong and Farhana Shukor Khazanah Research Institute
- Anise Kaz Klima Action Malaysia
- Lim Kai Sin Malaysian Youth Delegation

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Wednesday, 9 October 2024 | Auditorium, ISIS Malaysia

# 1 Introduction

On 9 October 2024, the Institute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia in collaboration with Third World Network hosted the COP29 masterclass. As a precursor to the 29th Conference of Parties (COP29) taking place on 11–22 November in Baku, Azerbaijan, the programme brought together various national stakeholders, emphasising on learning through sharing by experts and interactive breakout sessions. Its objectives include:

- i. To understand Malaysia's national priorities in fulfilling climate goals as well as the dynamics of climate negotiations at the international level;
- ii. To explore key agendas at COP29 and relate them to national contexts, including outcomes of the first Global Stocktake, Mitigation Work Programme (MWP), Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) and National Adaptation Plan (MyNAP), as well as the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance; and,
- iii. To provide a neutral and alternative platform for national stakeholders to exchange perspectives on Malaysia's climate ambitions, in advocating for and achieving equitable progress at the global negotiations level.

# 2 Structure and process

The programme was split into three components of **scene-setting**, a **panel discussion** and **breakout sessions**.

First, two **scene-setting presentations** by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Sustainability on Malaysia's national agenda and priorities at COP29, followed by Third World Network's presentation on civil society's outlook and advocacy demands.

This was followed by a **panel discussion** exploring pertinent themes, including mitigation, adaptation, finance and climate justice through the perspective of gender and youth.

The panel session set the context for the subsequent **breakout sessions** whose outcomes are what compromise the substance of this report. The breakout sessions were structured to foster active discussions on Malaysia's priorities and positioning for COP29 while learning from each other.

Following an initial briefing to align participants, the masterclass participants were divided into four groups, each dedicated to a key theme: mitigation (including Article 6), adaptation, finance and climate justice.

Facilitators led, with rapporteurs capturing critical discussion points using Miro board, each group. Participants worked through a set of three general and four thematic questions, using collaborative tools, such as sticky notes and the Eisenhower matrix, to prioritise responses to certain questions.

Each group focused on thematic questions to explore ways forward and challenges, such as financing mechanisms, adaptation priorities or equitable approaches to climate justice. If time permitted, they also engaged with broader, cross-cutting questions involving Malaysia's

positioning, priorities and ASEAN chairmanship.

At the end of the sessions, a representative presented a summary of the group's deliberations during a debrief session. The discussions from the breakout sessions have been compiled here. The programme and list of participants are listed in <u>Appendix 1</u> and Appendix 2.

# 3 Sectoral findings

## 3.1 Theme: Mitigation

Supplementary areas: Global Stocktake, Mitigation Work Programme, Just Transition Work Programme, Article 6

## Key takeaways

- 1. Malaysia's priority mitigation areas should take a two-pronged approach: 1) reducing emissions at the source by transitioning to a sustainable low-carbon energy system and adopting a holistic low-carbon transport system, alongside reducing emissions across other key sectors and 2) enhancing carbon sinks and reservoirs to support the achievement of NDC goals and aspiration of net-zero by 2050.
- 2. As part of a just transition, Malaysia should put in safeguards and regulations to manage the environmental and social risks associated with emerging sectors, such as development of critical minerals and rare earth elements (REE) industry, carbon capture utilisation and storage (CCUS/CCS), as well as future challenges related to clean energy and the digital supply chain, including battery and solar PV waste.
- 3. Malaysia must determine its stance on Article 6 to ensure the operationalisation of high-integrity carbon markets (involving quantifiable emissions reductions with cobenefits for relevant communities, clearly defined terms on verification and regulation and clarifying federal-state jurisdiction on carbon) at the domestic, regional and international level.

## **Context and introduction**

The Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (MWP) discussions follow and complement the outcomes of the UAE consensus (the first Global Stocktake), in which several mitigation targets were outlined – including the first in-text reference of transitioning away from fossil fuels. The MWP aims to scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical period of action. Complementing this is the UAE Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP), which aims to ensure just and equitable mitigation pathways especially for developing nations.

Article 6, more widely known as carbon markets, facilitates internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) to meet NDCs. Article 6.2 recognises bilateral cooperation

among parties while 6.4, the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM), facilitates a centralised international carbon market. Meanwhile 6.8 addresses non-market approaches (NMAs). Negotiations on Article 6.2 and 6.4 have stalled because of technical disagreements surrounding authorisation, regulation and operationalisation. There is increasing pressure, including from the Azerbaijan presidency, to resolve these issues and properly operationalise Article 6 at COP29.

## **Discussion points**

Malaysia's general priorities at COP should include equitable transition financing, access to loss and damage funds, strengthening collaboration and finding common interest with G77 + China, and capacity building.

<u>Mitigation priorities for NDC 3.0, NDC Roadmap and Long-Term Low Emissions Development</u> <u>Strategy (LT-LEDS)</u>

Below are the priority mitigation areas to inform NDC 3.0 as well as other sectoral plans based on the outcomes of the Global Stocktake:

- Sustainable energy system and value chain:
  - Energy efficiency, utilisation of existing building rooftop for solar PV to reduce land competition, early retirement of coal plants if financially viable, adoption of circular economy (for solar PV waste, batteries, EV etc).
  - Grid and infrastructure modernisation by improving grid system to enable higher adoption of RE in the energy mix.
  - $\odot$  Advancing other clean energy solutions such as hydrogen for industries.
  - Methane capture and abatement for waste, oil and gas production, agriculture and other relevant sectors.
- Forestry and land use (critical for carbon sinks Malaysia's net-zero aspirations are contingent on the assumption that current forest stocks are preserved beyond 2050 and there is political will to halt deforestation by 2030):
  - O Conserving virgin forested areas and other afforestation efforts.
  - Sustainable commodities, especially palm oil, to reduce deforestation risks and navigating supranational trade tactics e.g. EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR).
- Sustainable transport system:
  - Enhancement and electrification of public transportation system that comprises of first- and last-mile connectivity that is safe and accessible for everyone instead of heavy promotion of EVs.
  - O Gradual subsidy rationalisation of private vehicles and fuel.
- Mandating risk assessments and cost-benefit analysis for emerging sectors and technologies, such as data centres and CCUS (carbon capture utilisation and storage) and CCS (carbon capture and storage) by an independent body.
- Capacity building for UNFCCC reporting obligations, including the Biennial Transparency Report (BTR) and NDCs as well as Malaysia participation in international carbon markets.

#### Article 6 (carbon markets)

This discussion focused on the principles and standards Malaysia should uphold for

participation in international carbon markets and improve the integrity of domestic carbon markets.

- Standards: Malaysia must determine its national positioning on Article 6 and, from there, build consensus among other nations to address issues of methodology and operationalisation, verification, transparency, regulation and oversight principles. Our national stance should not compromise on high-integrity carbon markets, ensuring quantifiable emission reductions and co-benefits to communities involved (such as engaging in FPIC and co-creation process for indigenous populations whose lands are involved).
  - O Malaysia could adopt global standards to promote a high-quality and highintegrity carbon market, such as Verra's Verified Carbon Standard, to align with international best practices. However, concern must also be noted about criticism of VCS<sup>1</sup>. Malaysia could also opt to produce its own domestic standard (such as MSPO for sustainable palm oil) or advocate for a regional standard for ASEAN (such as ASEAN Common Carbon Framework to produce high-integrity carbon credits and develop interoperable carbon markets within the region during Malaysia's chairmanship tenure) or other megadiverse countries.
- National priorities: carbon trading should prioritise domestic carbon markets to ensure that carbon stocks remain in the country to reduce the risk of overselling to overseas buyers under compliance markets that might cripple the nation's ability to achieve its own NDC and net-zero by 2050 commitments. Addressing the federal-state jurisdictional complexities on carbon is also crucial to achieve this.
  - Given our crediting potential, Malaysia must also solidify its stance on criteria for market mechanisms.

## **Recommendations for national positioning**

- On GST, JTWP and MWP:
  - Pursue more holistic decarbonisation options and levers and considering the environmental and social risks across supply chain.
  - Catalysing adequate financing, particularly NCQG target.
- On Article 6:
  - Items which fall under Article 6 should serve the purpose of emission reduction and not be counted as part of climate finance delivery, as it would detract from the delivery of genuine climate finance commitments by Annexe I countries.
  - O The national position on emission avoidance (credits produced by not undertaking carbon-emitting activities) and "nature-based solutions" through conservation enhancement projects should be a red line, given the risks they pose towards meaningful emission reduction and complicate the existing need for robust verification and regulatory standards.
  - Malaysia should appoint a national focal point for Article 6.8 to gain access to the UNFCCC's web-based platform for parties to cooperate via NMAs, such as capacity building, technology transfers and financing. Work with non-state actors, such as civil society actively involved in conservation efforts, should also be facilitated as NMAs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Guardian investigation found that more than 90% of the carbon credits issued by Verra's forest conservation projects did not represent real emission reductions with many projects overstated the threat of deforestation by up to 400%, inflating the credit value.

## 3.2 Theme: Adaptation

Supplementary areas: Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), National Adaptation Plan (NAP), loss and damage

### Key takeaways

- 1. Malaysia should push for greater support to build capacity for governance. Effective adaptation in Malaysia hinges on strong inter-ministerial coordination, transparent governance, clear KPIs, equitable financing and data-driven decision-making across key sectors.
- 2. On GGA indicators, special focus on water security is essential for adaptation, with poverty indicators going beyond GDP to include access to basic rights.
- 3. Access to adequate funding, including loss and damage funds, is crucial for Malaysia, which has already faced economic and cultural (non-economic) losses from climate impacts.

# **Context and introduction**

Under Article 7 of the Paris Agreement, GGA aims to boost adaptive capacity, resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change. The Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheikh Work Programme, launched at COP26 in 2021, aimed to develop adaptation targets and methodologies. At COP28 in 2023, the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience outlined broad goals in key themes, such as water, health and food security. However, issues remain over measurable indicators and determining the means of implementation, which need resolution by COP30.

## **Discussion points**

Key adaptation priorities, including MyNAP

- Besides various thematic sectors, the discussion concluded that governance is among the most urgent and important priority area to push for adaptation including interministerial coordination, transparency, clear KPIs and equitable financing across ministries, alongside data and evidence-based information.
- The response to adaptation is different from mitigation. Whilse mitigation has a clear collective global goal to address climate change, adaptation is local action response to a global impact. The current policy framework has given inadequate priority towards adaptation, thereby impacting on implementation.
- Parties are also encouraged to communicate adaptation. Malaysia should strengthen its adaptation communicating by emphasising the process and preparation of the National Adaptation Plan (MyNAP), in addition to Chapter 4 under the National Communication and NDC.
- Although negotiations on loss and damage is important, Malaysia should go beyond items,

such as the GGA and L&D, to assert our needs which include other elements in Article 7 and 8 across the main functions of communication, planning and implementation

- An important distinction to make is between a country's official positions and underlying interests. For adaptation negotiations, it might be beneficial to align with a group of countries beyond the traditional G77 + China bloc. Regardless, any option should be explored carefully to ensure it aligns with our broader interests.
- Water is a significant medium in which climate change impacts are experienced, both in terms of vulnerability and as a hazard. Addressing both risks and adaptive measures, the intersections of water security and water-food-energy nexus should be supplemented through human-nature relations, community resilience, biodiversity, public health, technology, poverty eradication and tourism.
- There are sectors exposed to extreme climate impacts, which could affect supply chains and food security. This is an issue that transcends borders as Malaysia is heavily dependent on food imports, such as onions and chicken feedstock, from countries also vulnerable to climate change.

#### Indicators for GGA targets

- Agreed to the seven thematic targets (water, health, biodiversity, food, infrastructure, poverty and heritage) and four adaptation cycle targets (climate risk and vulnerability assessments, planning, implementation, and monitoring, evaluation and learning) under GGA.
- Given that a majority of Malaysia's extreme climate events are water-related, emphasis should be given to water security, where availability could be an indicator with water-stress index as a KPI.
- Where poverty eradication is a key priority to Malaysia, it is important to acknowledge how climate change exacerbates global poverty. Indicators for areas of poverty in Malaysia should include multi-dimensional criteria, not only income and livelihoods but also dignified living, equality and access to basic rights to clean environment, energy, nutrition, education and healthcare, among others.
- Per the Notre Dame Global Adaptation (ND-GAIN) Index, governance is one of the biggest challenges for developing countries to enhance their adaptation readiness. This includes Malaysia, in which strong and good governance is key to implementing the adaptation cycle, including risk-based planning, which requires significant capacity building, reliable data and financing.

#### Financing, and loss and damage

- Funding and financing are crucial means for implementation, particularly to implement MyNAP and expanding adaptation planning to the sub-national level and cross-sectoral mainstreaming.
- Malaysia has already experienced loss and damage from climate shocks and slowonset events. Loss and damage in the form of economic losses are well documented, but non-economic losses (already difficult to quantify) require more holistic forms of assessment. An example of non-economic loss is sea-level rise which erodes coastal land and resources, including irreplaceable cultural heritage, such as the Mah Meri tribe in Port Klang.
- As a non-Annexe I country, Malaysia and other developing countries should be eligible to

and able to access the Loss and Damage Fund in an inclusive and equitable manner under the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and climate justice. This includes, not only from the perspective of historical emissions, but also acknowledging the legacy of colonialism in terms of resource exploitation and appropriation, which has been a major driver of global inequality and uneven development. These circumstances have enabled developed countries in the Global North to prepare better for the impacts of climate change compared with the Global South, which have had to grapple with adapting to these impacts and facing disproportionate irreversible damages.

#### **Recommendations for national positioning**

- Continue to push for adequate support for means of implementation for developing countries, including funding to develop and implement MyNAP; especially in strengthening governance. Maintain the position that Malaysia should be given access to the Loss and Damage Fund, emphasising Article 2 of the Paris Agreement.
- Specific targets in GGA should place greater emphasis on water security and multidimensional poverty in the context of Malaysia and the Global South.

#### 3.3 Theme: Finance

Supplementary areas: New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), response measures

#### Key takeaways

- 1. Contributor base for climate finance should not be expanded against the principles of equity and CBDR under the Paris Agreement. Malaysia should maintain its status as a non-Annexe I country and advocate for the existing contributor base to increase their provisions in the form of grants and divesting financial flows.
- 2. Malaysia should make strategic and ample use of its access to climate finance, especially for prioritising adaptation measures.
- 3. Malaysia must oppose continuously and proactively unilateral trade measures and build solidarity among other member states to maintain this stance.

#### **Context and introduction**

NCQG is a crucial negotiation agenda for the year. The parties had previously agreed to determine a new climate finance goal before 2025, to accelerate the achievement of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement by increasing meaningful finance flows towards implementation of mitigation and adaptation. The NCQG landscape in the lead-up to COP29 has been contentious, given previous failures from developed countries in achieving the previous US\$100 billion (RM440 billion) per year by 2020 contribution, with the added gravitas of 70% of all climate finance being comprised of loans. Beyond that, negotiations prior to COP29 have seen parties fail to define a quantum and pressures from developed nations to expand

the contributor base to include developing nations of varying criteria. The heart of equity and CBDR principles is being called into question.

# **Discussion points**

#### <u>NCQG</u>

- The current criteria for contributor base towards climate finance should be maintained that being Annexe I countries, with the option for countries beyond this categorisation (such as Turkey, a member of both Annexe I and II) to opt in. Historically, Annexe I countries have failed to fulfil their climate finance obligations and should be increasing their contributions. According to the principles of the Paris Agreement as outlined in Article 2, it is inappropriate to expect developing nations to forcibly shoulder those burdens when renewing the climate finance goal. In this vein, Malaysia should continue to remain outside of Annexe I as it also runs the risk of exposing other developing nations towards these obligations.
- Malaysia should also be strategic about requesting for the climate finance it is entitled to, including access towards the Loss and Damage Fund. Moving towards NDC 3.0, Malaysia should utilise conditional NDCs (including making use of external financial support to which Malaysia is, once again, entitled) to achieve its national emission reduction pledges.
- On Malaysia's climate finance needs:
  - India initially called for US\$1 trillion per year from developed countries to support developing nations. However, a more realistic estimate would be US\$5.8 trillion annually up to 2050 for all 152 developing countries. This estimation was partly based on calculations for Malaysia's needs.
- Malaysia's NETR requires an estimated RM1.3 trillion in investments, with an additional RM392 billion for flood-related adaptation. Other unquantified factors, such as sea-level rise, heat, carbon sink and cost of capital, are expected to increase further these needs. As a result, Malaysia's total requirement is projected to double the initial estimate of RM700 billion, which was used as a baseline for other developing nations.
- Needs determination for climate financing in Malaysia is of utmost importance and urgency. Items identified during the breakout discussion include:
  - At highest levels of importance and urgency, measures centred around adaptation

     including addressing sea-level rise, heat and floods were explicitly identified.
     Measures to enhance carbon sinks and refining public transportation were also
     included.
  - At high levels of importance but of lower urgency are robust green buildings and infrastructure.
  - At lower levels of both importance and urgency are energy transition (which is positioned by national policies to catalyse external investment and financing) and promoting ownership of electrical vehicles.

Response measures (addressing cross-border impacts of mitigation policies)

• Malaysia must continuously oppose unilateral trade measures, such as the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which should be viewed as protectionism. Should there be inadequate pushback, this could start a precedent for

other countries (primarily that of the Global North such as Australia and the United States) with the intention of setting up their own CBAMs to impose unfair regulations onto the developing world, setting penalties for byproducts of their own colonial legacies. While such concerns have been raised by our neighbours (Thailand and Indonesia) and on platforms, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), they should be emphasised at the international level (i.e. COP), for example a unified stance at the calibre of the G77 + China coalition.

#### **Recommendations for national positioning**

- Maintain red line against expanding contributor base for climate finance and ensure that Annexe I countries remain as primary contributors.
  - Maintain access towards climate finance, namely adaptation and Loss and Damage Fund. This access should also be utilised strategically according to Malaysia's needs, such as conditional NDCs.
  - Develop a stance on how there is already adequate public money available for rich countries to pay their share of climate action, in line with the CBDR principle. These can be divested from various potential sources through new, fair, redistributive and polluter-pays measures<sup>2</sup>.
- Maintain red line against unilateral trade measures and elevate this as a concern at the international climate governance level. Any trade measure devised should be a multilateral process with those most impacted so that all parties' needs are considered. In addition, there is a need to be able to recognise when trade measures are being masked as climate initiatives. Information exchange between Malaysia's negotiating teams across ministries (such as NRES and MITI) is crucial to identify any overlap and better form national strategies.

#### 3.4 Theme: Climate justice

Supplementary areas: Gender, just transition, youth

#### **Key takeaways**

- 1. It is crucial to identify the systemic inequalities which emerge because of climate impacts across vulnerable populations.
- 2. Just transition should not be solely based on the energy transition but also consider dimensions of human rights and labour, as well as regulatory frameworks.
- 3. Ensuring procedural justice through implementation of rights-based approaches and institutionalising measures to improve participation in domestic and international climate governance processes. Additionally, ensure inter-ministerial coordination and engagement to identify the intersections of climate impacts and ensure polycentric-governance approach to address these issues, and ensure no perspectives are left behind.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> An example is Oil Change International's report on divesting public funds from developed nations to mobilise more than US\$5.3 trillion per year for climate action, which could serve as the new NCQC target: <u>https://www.oilchange.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Fact-Sheet-We-can-pay-for-it-1.pdf</u>

## **Context and introduction**

Climate justice aims to ensure social inclusion and equity, especially that of vulnerable and marginalised communities, when addressing the effects of climate change. This is especially crucial in acknowledging the intersectionality of (often unseen) impacts suffered by these demographics. The supplementary areas identified under this theme included gender, just transition and youth, although the discussion was by no means limited to these areas. Discussion points

- Vulnerable communities who take on disproportionate burdens because of climate change identified throughout the discussion include (but are not limited to) gender, children and youth, people with disabilities, low-income communities, indigenous people, and ageing societies.
  - On gender, women are often disproportionately affected by climate impacts through additional unpaid care labour responsibilities and disrupted access to sexual and reproductive healthcare.
  - On children and youth, education is often compromised because of climate impacts, and there is a need for more holistic engagement with youth to ensure their perspectives are integrated into policies that have direct impact on their futures.
- The discussions (and negotiations) surrounding the concept of "just transition" must not be centred solely on the energy transition and complementary to the actions highlighted under mitigation and JTWP. The "just energy transition" comprises not only diversifying energy sources but also ensuring energy access as well as improving energy efficiency for all, especially marginalised communities in rural areas. More broadly, the concept also relates to human rights issues, such as labour and gainful employment surrounding green jobs; implementation of business and human rights framework; and transparency, accountability and regulatory standards surrounding the greening of industries.
- Rights-based approaches and improving access to climate governance, including education and capacity building relating to the Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) negotiation agenda, are crucial.
  - Rights-based approaches highlighted include the right to environment (as ratified by the United Nations General Assembly in July 2022), freedom of information, grievance mechanisms and other measures to ensure legislative access to justice.
  - Access to climate governance and capacity building: civil society actors are often inadequately considered in COP processes, both locally and internationally, including cross-ministerial engagements beyond NRES. Consider the definition of "meaningful participation" – this should not simply mean ensuring an individual or demographic has a seat on the table but also how they get there, how to utilise their inputs and what are the subsequent actionable steps.
  - O The ACE negotiation agenda, per Article 6 of the Convention and Article 12 of the Paris Agreement, aims to enable all walks of society to engage in climate action through the ACE toolbox consisting of six key elements: education, training, public awareness, public access to information, public participation and international cooperation. These elements are closely tied to the work of civil society, and participation in this agenda could enhance the whole-of-nation approach needed to achieve climate justice.

• Other highlighted issues include improving data accessibility (including gender segregated data), transparency, undoing Global North narratives in climate education and reporting.

## **Recommendations for national positioning**

- Appointment of Gender National Focal Point, ACE National Focal Point, and other National Focal Points that are empowered under the Convention, to ensure access to resources, mobilisation of action plans (such as Gender Action Plan and National ACE Strategy), and that Malaysian perspectives are included.
- Access to capacity building as well as knowledge/technological development and transfers for developing nations.

# 4 Other findings with domestic implications

While main discussions centred on strengthening Malaysia's negotiation stance at COP29, many suggestions emerged on actions that could be enhanced at the domestic level, including at sub-national levels. They include the following:

- 1. Institutionalise rights-based approach in procedural planning process, including environmental and social impact assessments, development plans (Rancangan Struktur Negeri, Rancangan Tempatan) and climate-related plans.
- 2. A whole-of-government approach towards the preparation of the national position at COP with meaningful inclusion of all relevant ministries. This is contingent upon adequate capacity building for the various ministries that would allow them to contribute meaningfully towards the national position.
- 3. Capitalise on Malaysia's ASEAN chairmanship in 2025 to push for collaboration between Southeast Asian countries for enhanced climate action, while being a coherent bloc at the COP level to call attention to the collective climate needs of member states.
- 4. The principle of CBDR and just transition apply beyond mitigation and energy transition to broader priorities. As a developing nation, Malaysia needs to pursue sustainable development and poverty eradication across multiple dimensions (e.g. transport, energy, food, living standards, clean environment and housing). Advance a whole-of-nation approach towards addressing climate change by institutionalising civil society and non-state actors in the consultative processes by having it codified in law as part of the upcoming Climate Change Act.

# 5 Conclusion

Through initiatives, such as the COP29 masterclass, ISIS Malaysia and TWN hope for a more inclusive approach towards the ministry's non-party stakeholder engagement process so that Malaysia could present a holistic and whole-of-nation approach in developing strategic negotiation stances at the international climate governance level. We also hope that this programme will be a complementary step towards NRES's own preparatory process, as well as a preliminary step for future engagements and to build momentum towards climate agendas in ASEAN chairmanship and COP30 in Brazil.

# Appendix

#### **AP1: Programme agenda**

Age	TWN Third World Network				
0830	Arrival				
0900	Welcoming remarks				
	<b>Datuk Prof Dr Mohd Faiz Abdullah</b> Chairman Institute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS Malaysia	)			
0910	Scene-setting – Malaysia's national climate agenda and COP29 priorities				
	<b>Dr Mohd Hafdzuan Adzmi</b> Principal Assistant Secretary (Policy Negotiation Unit) Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Sustainability (NRES)				
0940	Big picture – COP29 and North-South dynamics of climate negotiations				
	<b>Meenakshi Raman</b> President of Sahabat Alam Malaysia; Head of Programmes of Third World Network (TWN)				
1000	Break				
1005	Panel session				
	Fellow Academy of Sciences Malaysia (ASM)	• <b>Yin Shao-Loong</b> Deputy Director of Research Khazanah Research Institute (i • <b>Anise Kaz</b> Gender Officer Klima Action Malaysia (KAMY)	KRI)		
1135	Briefing on breakout sessions				
1150	Lunch & networking				
1330	Breakout sessions • Breakout 1: Mitigation (including Article 6) • Breakout 2: Adaptation (including Loss and Damage) • Breakout 3: Finance (including Trade) • Breakout 4: Climate justice (including Gender and Youth)				
1530	Break and debrief				
1600	End				

Photos from the event: https://www.isis.org.my/recent-event/cop29-masterclass/

# **AP2 - List of participants**

No.	Name (first)	Name (last)	Organisation	Designation
1	Afandi	Nor Azmi	ISIS Malaysia	Fellow
2	Ahmad Shamim Nazli	Ahmad Shalimin	UNICEF	N/A
3	Aidil Iman	Aidid	Khazanah Research Institute	Policy Research Intern
4	Ain	Zahra	WWF-Malaysia	Climate Adaptation Assistant
5	Anise	Kaz	Klima Action Malaysia (KAMY)	Climate Change and Gender Researcher
6	Anusha	Rym	UNDP Malaysia	Communications Officer, Youth Environment Living Labs (YELL)
7	Aurora Fong Yun	Tin	Bursa Malaysia	Manager, Bursa Carbon Exchange
8	Aznie	Rahim	Malaysian Water Partnership (MyWP)	Member
9	Dhana Raj	Markandu	ISIS Malaysia	Senior Analyst
10	Dun Xin	Weng	Greenpeace SEA (Malaysia)	Zero Waste Campaigner
11	Eqram	Mustaqeem	Third World Network	Research and Policy Analyst
12	Farhan		ISIS Malaysia	Researcher
13	Farhana	Shukor	Khazanah Research Institute (KRI)	Climate Finance Project Researcher
14	Foong Ling	Chen	Energy Action Partners (ENACT)	Program Coordinator
15	Ganesha	Pillai	Asia School of Business	Senior Research Associate
16	Hamizah	Shamsudeen	Greenpeace Southeast Asia Berhad	Climate & Energy Campaigner
17	Hazwan	Hasnol	Ministry Of Foreign Affairs	Assistant Secretary
18	Helena	Varkkey	Universiti Malaya (UM)	Associate Professor
19	Huzairi	Zainal Abidin	Ministry of Finance	Head of Section
20	Izzatul Shima	Md Thahir	Jabatan Pembangunan Wanita (JPW)	Deputy Director General
21	Jasmin Irisha	Jim Ilham	UNICEF	Climate and Environment Officer
22	Jiun Ting	Saw	Youth Environment Living Labs (YELL)	Intern
23	Ka Jun	Oh	Bank Negara Malaysia	Climate Policy Associate Analyst
24	Kai Sin	Lim	Malaysian Youth Delegation (MYD)	Co-Focal Point
25	Khalisah Khairina	Razman	Malaysian Youth Delegation (MYD)	Mitigation Working Group Coordinator
26	Kieran Li	Nair	ISIS Malaysia	Senior Researcher
27	Kiran	Jacob	The Edge Malaysia	Writer
28	Kok-Seng	Үар	Academy of Sciences Malaysia (ASM)	Fellow

29	Meenakshi	Raman	Sahabat Alam Malaysia (SAM); Third World Network (TWN)	President; Head of Programmes
30	Mellaney	Goh	Bar Council Environment & Climate Change Committee	Research Officer
31	Mohd Hafdzuan	Adzmi	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Sustainability (NRES)	Chief Assistant Secretary (Policy Negotiation Unit)
32	Mohd Ridzwan	Shahabudin	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Principal Assistant Secretary
33	Nabila	Zulkeflee	Center to Combat Corruption and Cronyism (C4 Center)	Environmental Research Officer
34	Nazran	Johari	ISIS Malaysia	Analyst
35	Nur Ayuni	Zainal Abidin	Ministry of Economy	Principal Assistant Director
36	Nur Hasyima	Ismail	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Sustainability	Assistant Secretary
37	Samantha	Khoo	ISIS Malaysia	Researcher
38	Shamala	Mary	Pengurusan Air Selangor	Vice President II
39	Shao Loong	Yin	Khazanah Research Institute (KRI)	Deputy Director of Research
40	MSharul Nizal	Sharippudin	Ministry of Housing and Local Government	Deputy Secretary, Department of Urban Sustainability and Green Environment
41	Sukhvinder (Vin)	Singh	Air Selangor	AVP II, Engagement Unit
42	Sunita	Rajakumar	Climate Governance Malaysia	Chairperson and Director
43	Syafiah	Hannani	Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Sustainability	Deputy Secretary, Climate Change Division
44	Tahirah	Banu	Bank Negara Malaysia	Climate Policy Analyst
45	Tommy Seng Kong	Cheo	WWF-Malaysia	Climate Adaptation Coordinator
46	Wan Nur Sakinah	Megat Shahir	Energy Action Partners (ENACT)	Project Officer
47	Yashirdisai	Sampasivam	Malaysian Youth Delegation (MYD)	Coordinator of Means of Implementation and Support Working Group
48	Zayana	Zaikariah	ISIS Malaysia	Researcher



INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (ISIS) MALAYSIA

Address1, Persiaran Sultan Salahuddin,<br/>50480 Kuala Lumpur, MalaysiaPhone603 2693 9366E-mailinfo@isis.org.my

www.isis.org.my



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