

# **The Economics of the Defence Industry: balancing self-reliance with interdependence**


**Dr. Kogila Balakrishnan**

## Content of the presentation

- ▶ What do we mean by self-reliance in the defence context ?
- ▶ Why do most states want to achieve self-reliance in defence industry?
- ▶ What are the key challenges in achieving self-reliance?
- ▶ Why interdependence for defence industrialisation?
- ▶ How to make interdependence work ?
- ▶ Recommendations for Malaysia and ASEAN states
- ▶ References

# What do we mean by self-reliance?

- ▶ The ability of a state actor to create a high level of defence capability in a given domain
- ▶ The question is: does a nation have all of the capabilities – people, technical and functional capability, infrastructure, logistics and supply chain, equipment and financial means, to develop self-reliance in a given domain?
- ▶ No state has the ability to create a totally autonomous defence capability – there is always a supply chain for creating work outside a state; even for the USA



# Why do states want to achieve self-reliance?

- ▶ Prestige and pride
- ▶ A state may be under sanctions or embargo
- ▶ To develop industrial and technological capabilities



# Examples of self-reliance

- Sweden: aircrafts, tanks, guns
- South Korea: high level of self-reliance with massive industrial capabilities
- Turkey: high level of industrial capabilities driven by investments in people/skills
- Brazil: aircraft industry (Embraer) car industry  
(Example Embraer KC-390)



# Challenges

- ▶ It is very expensive and costly to be self-reliant
- ▶ Access to technology
- ▶ Integrating and managing the complex weapon systems
- ▶ Co-dependence
- ▶ National priorities



# Cost

- ▶ The cost becomes far too expensive – Example of French and Swedish fighters, yet both countries still have many sub-systems from outside their own countries; do it for national pride
- ▶ Cost escalation: as per unit costs of defence equipment is increasing exponentially (see ref: <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/is-the-u-s-military-getting-smaller-and-older>)



# Complex weapons


- ▶ Modern weapon platforms inherently complex, (i.e. they contain multiple complex subsystems)
- ▶ Example include the F35, A400M
- ▶ Team complex weapons led by MBDA





# Access to technology

- ▶ Do you have access to the technology you want to acquire to build the defence sub-systems
- ▶ Sensitivity of the technologies; frequently classified
- ▶ Security of technology, such as patent protection and licensing
- ▶ Political question – are you politically aligned to the providers of technology that you require?



# Co-dependence

- ▶ Relationship and trust building, to get access to the technologies
- ▶ Example – Japan and the UK building 6<sup>th</sup> generation jet fighters due to the trust and relationship in sharing of the technology
- ▶ AUKUS – Australia, UK and the US sharing of a sensitive technology platform.



# Malaysian example for potential self-reliance

- ▶ **Systems integration:** electronics industry manufacturing capability – dual-use value and value in building more complex defence platforms
- ▶ **Integrated domain littoral naval systems** (air and sea) including under water submersibles
- ▶ **Hybrid/electric military vehicles** – example of Ukraine soldiers using e-bikes plus Next Generation light anti tank weapons (NLAW missiles)



# Why interdependence for defence industrialisation?

Costs of funding of a whole system by a single nation is becoming increasingly expensive

Cost of defence equipment increasing faster than defence budgets and less units being procured

Dis-economies of scale effect specific equipment (aircraft/missiles) where costs is high

Dynamic geo-political challenges requiring newer technologies to meet armed forces capability requirements  
e.g. AUKUS

# Examples of defence industry interdependence


- ▶ Classic example of 5th generation fighters- F35, Eurofighters, SU35
- ▶ Even single nation fighter aircraft such as Gripens (Sweden) and Rafale (France) all require sub-systems from many countries
- ▶ Governments always under-estimate the costs of collaborative working



# Example of International collaboration: Joint Strike Fighter (F-35): Global Partnership




## Global Production System



Source: Slideshare.net DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


# Eurofighter Typhoon



Typhoon Supply Chain. Source: BAES internal document, 29 April 2021

Source: Matthews, R & Al- Saadi, R. 'Organizational complexity of the Eurofighter Typhoon Collaborative supply chain, *Defence and Peace Economics*, Routledge, Vol.

# Example of International collaboration: The A400M international partnership






# Challenges for interdependence in defence industrialisation

- **Example: EU Defence industrial consolidation** - EU budget, unpredicted impact from COVID 19 pandemic on national defence spending; fragmented and inefficient production, intensifying and global competition.
- **ASEAN Defence industry collaboration** – different priorities, lack of political will and issues with technology sharing

# How to work effectively in an interdependent environment

- ▶ To what degree are Malaysia and other ASEAN states interdependent?
- ▶ One way forward is through greater sharing of information rather than just technology
- ▶ Example: share capability for the air-re-fuelling tanker



## Recommendation for Malaysia and ASEAN states

- ▶ There are inherent limits to self reliance in this domain
- ▶ At the political level, transfer of defence technologies requires deep trusted relationships that take a long time to develop
- ▶ Focus on short term trust building measures
- ▶ Develop mid to long-term, co-dependent technical basis for dual-use technology capabilities



# Conclusion

- ▶ Self-reliance is always costly so pick and choose priority areas carefully
- ▶ Interdependence requires careful partner selection and deep trusted relationship
- ▶ Build a portfolio of options based on future capability requirements
- ▶ Underlying drivers: consider the ever increasing technical complexity of defence platforms and associated cost escalation



# Finally....

This is not a static  
decision process

Will require continuous  
repeated political and  
defence dialogues


Due to the dynamic  
nature of the threat and  
geopolitical environment



# References

- ▶ Balakrishnan, K. (2018) Technology Offsets in International Defense Procurement. Oxford: Routledge.
- ▶ Balakrishnan, K. (2021) 'Future of The European Defence Industrial and Technological Base (EDTIB) Post Brexit: Nationalization Versus Integration?' Defence & Security Analysis, 36(4), 458 -489.
- ▶ Balakrishnan, K. and Nadira, T. (2021). 'Malaysian Defence Industry: Context, Challenges and The Way Forward,' The Journal of Defence and Security, 14(1).
- ▶ Kogila Balakrishnan and Richard Bitzinger, (2012). 'ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration, Getting to Yes', RSIS Commentaries, 23 December .
- ▶ Ron Matthews and Kogi Balakrishnan,(2010). 'ASEAN Defence Industrial Collaboration: The Way Forward?' Asian Defence and Diplomacy, April/May pp.54-60
- ▶ Ron Matthews and Kogila Balakrishnan, (2010). Speculating the Future: ASEAN Defence Industrial Collaboration? RSIS Commentaries, 20 May
- ▶ Balakrishnan, K., and Matthews, R. (2009). 'The Role of Offsets in Malaysian Defence Industrialization.' Defence Peace Economics, 20(4), pp.341-358.

# Contact Details



Dr Kogila Balakrishnan

Email:

[Kogila.Balakrishnan@warwick.ac.uk](mailto:Kogila.Balakrishnan@warwick.ac.uk)

Phone: +44 (0) 7824086940

